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CAN HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS PREDICT ACTUAL PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC
 
PROGRAMS? A FIELD VALIDITY TEST USING A PROVISION POINT MECHANISM
 
Abstract 
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation utilized a demand revealing public good mechanism to 
implement a green electricity program for provision of renewable energy and planting trees. 
This GreenChoice™ program provided an opportunity to test the reliability of contingent 
valuation for predicting actual participation levels. In this study, participation levels predicted 
by hypothetical open-ended and dichotomous choice questions are compared to a reference level 
obtained from the actual GreenChoice™ program. This approach represents an important 
improvement over past public goods contingent valuation validity tests which have relied on 
voluntary contribution mechanisms to elicit actual willingness to pay, and thus are likely to 
overestimate hypothetical bias because of free riding. Yet, even with a demand revealing 
mechanism and controlling for awareness, hypothetical participation levels obtained from 
dichotomous choice responses are found to significantly exceed actual contributions. In contrast, 
open-ended responses predict actual contribution levels, in that hypothetical open-ended 
responses are not significantly different from actual responses. Calibration of hypothetical 
responses is also explored. 
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CAN HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS PREDICT ACTUAL PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC 
PROGRAMS? A FIELD VALIDITY TEST USING A PROVISION POINT MECHANISM; 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A critical issue in environmental economics and public policy is the ability of contingent 
valuation (CV) to measure "actual" willingness to pay (WTP) for environmental commodities 
(Arrow et al., 1993). Early validity field research compared hypothetical CV responses with 
values obtained from auctions and other actual market transactions for private (e.g. strawberries, 
Dickie et al., 1987) and quasi-public goods (e.g. hunting permits, Bishop and Heberlein, 1979), 
concluding that "the overwhelming weight from simulated market experiments favors the use of 
contingent valuation for estimating willingness to pay" (Bishop and Heberlein, 1990). More 
recent efforts have sought to extend the CVfactual market comparisons to less familiar public 
goods with large nonuse components: Duffield and Patterson (1992) conducted such 
comparisons for leasing water rights for threatened trout streams, Seip and Strand (1992) 
evaluated hypothetical and actual sign-ups for an environmental organization, Brown et al. (1996) 
compared hypothetical and real donations for the removal of roads on the north rim of the Grand 
Canyon, and Navrud and Veisten (1997) compared hypothetical and actual payments for old 
growth forest parcels. Together, these studies have suggested that there are considerable 
differences between hypothetical and actual contributions, which have largely been attributed to 
biases associated with the hypothetical nature ofCV. For example, Brown et al. (1996, p. 164) 
argue that "Hypothetical questions, especially about donations to generally desirable 
environmental goods seem to engender overestimates of actual WTP." Such conclusions have lent 
some support to efforts to discredit CV as a public policy decision tool. They have also led to 
efforts to "calibrate hypothetical CV responses to better approximate measures of actual WTP" 
(e.g. Champ et al., 1995, 1997). 
Using these past field comparisons as a justification for not using CV in public policy 
applications, or as a metric for calibrating CV values, is premature. Each of these comparisons 
relies on a voluntary market contributions mechanism (VCM) as a criterion for conducting the 
validity test. Theoretical developments following Samuelson (1954) and decades of experimental 
economics research indicate that these mechanisms are neither incentive compatible in theory nor 
demand revealing in practice (see Ledyard, 1995, for a comprehensive review of the literature): 
i.e. free riding is the expected norm. In VCM experiments involving real money, individuals 
typically contribute 40 to 60 percent of the Pareto optimum level. This failure of the VCM to 
elicit honest revelation ofdemand for public goods in the laboratory makes it an inappropriate 
market criterion to assess the validity of CV in field tests. Importantly, it casts serious doubts 
on the claim made by other researchers that CV suffers from hypothetical bias. Indeed, it is 
possible that the difference between hypothetical WTP and actual contributions found 
previously could largely be attributed to free riding rather than an expression ofupward bias in 
hypothetical answers. 1 
In order to conduct more accurate field validity tests of the contingent valuation method, a 
demand revealing one-shot mechanism is needed to collect actual payments that more closely 
1 To their credit, each of the aforementioned authors are apparently aware of the possible biases associated 
with using a VCM as a reference criterion for willingness to pay. For example, Seip and Strand (1992) note, "we 
may have significant free rider problems in voluntary payment" (p. 103). Brown et al. (1996) similarly note that a 
"voluntary payment towards a public good allows for free-riding...to the extent that free-riding occurs, it depresses 
actual payments" (p. 154). 
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reflect true WTP. Here, demand revelation is defined in the purely empirical sense that 
individuals provide their true values through payments to a public fund. Importantly, the . 
mechanism needs to be demand revealing in a single request for contributions so that it mirrors 
the context employed in actual CV. 
To our knowledge, this paper presents the first field study to use such a demand revealing 
reference mechanism to test hypothetical bias and possible calibration alternatives in contingent 
valuation. This research is particularly timely because it focuses on green pricing, an approach 
increasingly being considered by public utilities to fund the development of renewable energy 
resources. 
"Green pricing is a generic term for the offer ofelectricity generated from clean, 
environmentally preferred sources such as solar, wind, geothermal and some types 
of biomass and hydro energy sources. Consumers who choose to purchase this 
product pay a small premium for the green electricity. This idea has been getting 
significant attention since its conception in 1992 (Moskovitz, 1992). Seven 
utilities now have some form of green marketing program in operation, and some 
twenty others have been considering whether to offer green pricing, including 
conducting market research into consumer preferences." (Holt, 1997, p. 1) 
Utility interest in this product has been motivated, in part, by national environmental opinion 
polls suggesting that majorities are willing to pay $6 to $25 more per month for green power 
(Farhar and Houston, 1996; Holt, 1997f Despite substantial evidence supporting public 
interest in green pricing programs, actual programs have been characterized by low participation 
2 Market research conducted for individual utilities generally supports these attitudinal fmdings: a 
Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD) study indicated that 43 percent of residential customers would pay 5 
percent or more for their energy for SMUD to invest in renewable energy products; a Massachusetts Electric 
Company survey estimated that 48 percent of residential customers would probably or definitely sign up at a 5 
percent premium; Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation research suggested that 60 percent of residential customers 
­
would sign up at a fixed rate of $6 per month; and survey research for an unnamed western electric utility suggested 
that 82 percent of residential customers would be willing to pay rate premiums for renewable energy generation 
programs (Holt; 1997; Brynes et al., 1995). 
3 
rates, usually less than 2 percent (Farhar and Houston, 1996). 
. Three explanations for this discrepancy seem likely. First, most utility customers may 
have been unaware of such programs, in spite of attempts by electric utilities to inform them 
using bill inserts, mailed brochures, and advertising. Since market research must necessarily 
inform customers of a green pricing program, it inherently creates perfect awareness. Thus, 
forecasts derived from market research depend critically on assumptions about the effectiveness 
of marketing (Wood et al., 1994). Second, free-riding may lower customer participation because 
participation has usually been structured as a charitable voluntary contribution.3 Finally, the 
hypothetical questions used in market research studies may lead to upward bias. In this paper 
we control for the first two issues by using a phone survey to create 100 percent awareness and 
utilizing a demand revealing mechanism for the actual collection of funds in a GreenChoice™ 
program offered by Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC). Thus we are able to isolate a 
\ direct test of hypothetical bias associated with different contingent valuation elicitation methods 
for this green pricing program. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a review 
3 Interestingly, the other recent green pricing programs to use provision point mechanisms have met their 
(often fairly low) funding objectives, in contrast to early unsuccessful programs associated with voluntary 
contribution mechanisms. Traverse City Light and Power and Fort Collins Light and Power attempted and 
completed windmill projects using a fIrst-come-first-served provision point mechanism. Participation in the 
Traverse City project was curtailed after the program's provision point was successfully reached with 263 customers, 
at an estimated 3.4 percent of targeted customers. At the time of this paper, Fort Collins had funded one of three 
windmills with no participation rates reported. Unfortunately, though the Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 
(NMPC) GreenChoice™ program was formally approved by the New York Public Service Commission, it was 
ultimately suspended before completion because NMPC developed serious fmancial difficulties and was unable to 
promote customer awareness of the program. Before suspension, the program was briefly mentioned in a bill insert 
and described in a brochure sent to about 38,000 ofNMPC's 1.2 million customers. Most of the planned 
marketing campaign, including a substantial advertising budget and tree plantings at public schools throughout the 
service territory, was canceled, and thus awareness was extremely low. Before the program was terminated, 
however, we were able to conduct the fIeld experiment described in this paper with NMPC customers using a phone 
survey. 
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of demand revealing public goods mechanisms and development of the mechanism used in this 
research. The third section describes the results of the validity test and .the assessment of , , 
calibration tools for open-ended and dichotomous choice contingent valuation. Conclusions and 
implications are provided in the final section. 
2. THE SEARCH FOR DEMAND REVEALING PUBLIC GOODS MECHANISMS 
An important fmding from decades of experimental economics research is that no public 
goods elicitation mechanism, even if it is theoretically incentive compatible, is perfectly demand 
revealing in practice (Smith, 1979, 1980; Harstad and Marrese, 1982). Some public goods 
mechanisms that increase incentives for honest revelation have been developed over the years 
(e.g. Groves-Ledyard, Tullock, Smith Auction, Clark), and have been shown to approach demand 
-revelation in laboratory experiments. Public goods experiments are able to assess the degree of 
demand revelation because the true values of individuals are induced by, and thus known to, the 
'researcher. Contributions to public goods in the laboratory can then be compared with individual 
and group induced values to assess the degree ofdemand revelation. 
Extending these mechanisms to CV field research is, however, problematic. Mechanisms 
such as the Groves-Ledyard (Groves and Ledyard, 1977) often involve extremely complex 
incentive structures--greatly limiting their applicability and usefulness in situations outside of 
confined laboratory settings. Other mechanisms, such as the Smith Auction (Smith 1979, 1980; 
Coursey and Smith, 1984; Harstad and Marrese, 1982), require unanimity, which necessitates an 
-
interactive small-group situation. Moreover, these techniques require multiple rounds before 
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they approximate group demand revelation, and, thus are not readily applicable in one-shot 
.situations. Thus, it is understandable that prior CV public goods field validity studies (Duffield 
and Patterson, 1992; Seip and Strand, 1992; Brown et al., 1996; Champ et al., 1995, 1997; and 
Navrud and Veisten, 1997) have relied on voluntary contributions. However, as noted above, the 
voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) is not theoretically incentive compatible and not 
empirically demand revealing. 
However, in recent research, three important modifications to the VCM have been shown 
to reduce free-riding in public goods experiments: 1) A provision point (PP) is a minimum level 
of aggregate contributions below which the public good is not provided. Isaac, Schmidtz and 
Walker (1989), Suleiman and Rapoport (1992), and Dawes, et al. (1986) report that adding a PP 
significantly increases contributions in a variety ofexperimental environments. 2) A money-back 
guarantee (MBO) can be added to a provision point mechanism (PPM) so that individual 
contributions are refunded if the PP is not reached by the group. Isaac, Schmidtz and Walker 
(1989) report that contribution levels were substantially and significantly higher in treatments 
with the MBO compared to baseline PP experiments without a refund. 3) A rebate rule for 
disposing of contributions in excess of the provision point is a second fonn of assurance against 
the potential loss of contributions. Rebate rules can take various fonns (see Marks and Crosson, 
1996, for a study ofaltemative rebate rules). For example, in the proportional rebate (PR) rule, 
all excess contributions are returned to contributors. Each individual receives a share of the 
excess proportional to the weight ofher contribution to the group fund. In an extended benefits 
(EB) rule, money collected in excess of the provision point would be used to extend benefits, or 
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increase the production of the public good. Extending benefits beyond the provision point does 
not modify individual incentives in theory, but simply creates a VCM environment beyond the. 
threshold. In evaluating alternative rebate rules for provision point mechanisms experimentally, 
Marks and Crosson (1996) found that offering extended benefits had the greatest positive effect 
upon group contributions. 
In all, the PPM with MBO and PR or EB rebate rules have been shown to be successful 
at increasing contributions to public goods in experimental settings. There are also anecdotal 
reports of provision points being used to successfully resolve actual free-riding problems (e.g. 
Bagnoli and McKee, 1991). Yet these mechanisms typically fail to produce demand revelation. 
Rather, as shown theoretically by Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) and suggested in empirical 
applications by Bagnoli and McKee (1991), these mechanisms produce an infinite number of 
Nash equilibria where the sum of contributions exactly covers costs (PP). In these circumstances 
efficiency is achieved but demand is under revealed (with the exception of the case where cost 
equals willingness to pay). It should be noted, however, that all existing,PPM experiments have· 
been conducted in experimental settings that greatly depart from field conditions: in particular 
they involve small groups with multiple rounds. In an effort to create a closer parallel with single 
shot, large group situations relevant for CV field research, we conducted a series ofprovision 
point experiments which are briefly reviewed here and reported in detail in Rondeau et al. (1996, 
1997) and Rose et al. (1996). 
In a first set of experiments (reported in Rondeau et al. 1996, 1997) we explored the 
•performance of the PP/MBO/PR mechanism as an alternative to the VCM in a setting where 
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subjects could contribute any feasible amount. Experiments to test the properties of this 
mechanism were conducted with subjects drawn from undergraduate Cornell University classes. 
At the beginning of each experiment, subjects read instructions that can be summarized as 
follows. "Participants are part of a group. Each person in the group is given an initial balance of 
money and must decide how much of this balance to keep and how much to allocate to a group 
fund. The group fund yields a return only if a predetermined investment cost (the PP) is met or 
exceeded. If the sum of contributions is below the PP, contributions are fully refunded (the 
MBG). Alternatively, if the sum of contributions equals or exceeds the PP, individual earnings 
are the total of her initial balance minus her contribution, plus her personal refund from the group 
fund (the benefits from the public good), plus a rebate equal to her share of the contributions in 
excess of the PP." Subjects were aware of the number ofparticipants in their group and that 
everyone had the same endowment, but were not told the level of the PP nor the private payoff 
to others from the public good. Three series of experiments were conducted using this 
mechanism, varying across experiments the group size, endowments, provision points, payoff 
functions, benefit cost ratios, and information about the provision point and the number of 
members in the group. 
The first series ofexperiments began with a design similar to that used in previous 
provision point research, involving three "small groups" (n=6) of introductory economics 
students in a multiple round contributions experiment. Pooling the data from the first round of 
all three small group experiments we fmd that, in the aggregate, the ratio of revealed to induced 
•demand is 67 percent. These results are far short of demand revelation but consistent with 
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aggregate demand results found in previous PPM experiments (64 percent, Marks and Crosson, 
1996; 61 percent, Cadsby and Maynes, 1996; 79 percent, Bagnoli and McKee, 1991). Using this 
experiment as a base, a second experiment was conducted with a much larger group of 50 
students drawn from an environmental economics class in a single shot environment--an 
environment never before tested using a provision point in a laboratory economics experiment. 
In searching for a demand revealing mechanism we noted that Isaac, Walker, and Williams (1994) 
found that individuals in groups of 40 and 100 participants contributed significantly more to a 
VCM public good than did subjects in small groups. Since group size for CV commodities is 
always large, we hoped that a larger group size might similarly improve the performance of 
provision point mechanisms. We thus switched to a single round to make the cheap riding 
behavior observed in the multiple round small group experiments more risky as well as to test a 
more practical field mechanism. 
In this second experiment, much to our surprise, groups approximately revealed demand 
in the aggregate for the public good. The ratio of aggregate revealed to induced demand was 107 
percent. Because of the possible sensitivity of these experiments to subject type (Marwell and 
Ames, 1981; Isaac, McCue, and Plott, 1985; Cadsby and Maynes, 1996), a third set of 
.experiments was conducted.with three groups of 45 students from an introductory natural 
resources class. To address the possibility that individuals would strategically respond in a cost 
sharing manner as predicted by PP Nash equilibria (Bagnoli and Lipman, 1989; Bagnoli and 
McKee, 1991) information about the number of participants and the provision point was varied. 
-
These experiments supported the fmdings of the previous experiment, with aggregate demand 
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revelation ranged from 96 to 112 percent across the varying information conditions. 
Based on the promising nature of these results, a second research effort-was undertaken to 
examine a mechanism that more closely corresponded to the actual NMPC collection mechanism 
(see Rose et al., 1996). The specific PPM design we considered corresponds to that used by 
NMPC to accelerate the development of renewable energy sources of electricity. The mechanism 
adopted by NMPC employed three of the features discussed previously. First, it contained a 
provision point of $864,000 to be raised through customer contributions. This minimum level of 
funding would provide for the construction of a renewable energy facility to serve 1,200 homes, 
and for the planting of 50,000 trees in the NMPC service area. Second, NMPC's funding 
mechanism offered a money back guarantee to customers which assured them that, if 
contributions failed to reach the threshold, all money collected would be refunded. Third, the 
mechanism offered the possibility ofextended benefits. Money collected in excess of the 
provision point would be used to increase the number ofhomes served with renewable energy or 
to plant more trees. 
One theoretically undesirable feature ofNMPC's mechanism was that, to legally qualify 
as a rate offering, the program could only be offered at a single posted price. Thus, customers 
. could choose only to contribute a fixed amount of $6.00 per month or not participate at all. A 
posted price is undesirable because it does not allow households to self-select a monthly fee that 
better represents their preferences for the program. Note that, despite the posted price, the 
mechanism does not reduce to a referendum, because the only individuals to pay are those who 
•choose to participate. 
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A laboratory experiment was designed to test the NMPC funding mechanism in a large 
group environment where program values could be induced. The experiment was performed in an 
undergraduate business-economics principles class using 100 students. This subject pool was 
specially chosen to give the mechanism a rigorous test because business and economics students 
contribute less in VCM experiments than other groups (Cadsby and Maynes, 1996). Each 
participant was given a starting value of $5 and the opportunity to join a group investment 
program for a one-time fixed fee of$3.· The group investment program only yielded returns if 40 
percent or more of the participants joined (the PP). Five groups of 20 subjects were assigned to 
one of five induced values {$0.50, $1.75, $3.00, $4.25, $5.50}. If more than 40 percent joined, 
each of the 100 participants received a "bonus payment" of 3¢ for each participant that joined in 
excess of the provision point (the EB). If fewer than 40 percent joined, the group investment 
program was canceled and all contributions were refunded (the MBG). 
Given the $3 fee and the distribution of induced values, if subjects behave as if the 
NMPC mechanism is demand revealing, we would expect that 50 percent of the 100 subjects 
would choose to participate in the program. We would also expect that, under a random utility 
model that accounts for individual errors, the participation rate should increase with induced 
value. At the aggregate level, 47 percent of the subjects chose to participate, resulting in the 
funding of the public good. Ignoring the extended benefit, this participation level closely 
approximates the 50 percent participation rate expected from demand revelation. Thus, in 
aggregate terms, this mechanism appears to provide an approximately demand revealing outcome 
for this sample design. Furthermore, using a random utility based logistic model, the response ­
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rate significantly increases with induced values and is not significantly different from 50 percent 
participation at the point where induced value equals cost ($3). 
3. THE NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION FIELD VALIDITY TEST 
3.1. Experimental Design 
Given that the NMPC mechanism appears to be approximately demand revealing in the 
aggregate in laboratory experiments, it may well provide a substantially better baseline than the 
VCM for a field validity test of contingent valuation. Thus participation in the GreenChoice™ 
program was solicited by telephone and compared with hypothetical responses in parallel 
contingent valuation telephone surveys. As described previously, the program used a 
PP/MBG/EB mechanism, with a single posted price of $6 per month. Contingent valuation 
responses were collected using two telephone formats. The first was a dichotomous choice 
version directly paralleling the actual solicitation. The second was an open-ended version asking 
respondents the most they would be willing to pay for the program. These two survey formats 
offer extremes on the continuum of continuous to discrete choice contingent valuation. Past 
experimental economics and contingent valuation research have demonstrated that substantial 
procedural variance exists between these formats (see summaries in Brown et al., 1996, and 
Schulze et al., 1996). A critical question from a policy standpoint is which format most closely 
approximates actual preferences. We will be examining this question in the case of a public good 
offered at a single price. 
•All survey instruments followed the Dillman Total Design Method for telephone surveys 
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(Dillman, 1978). The method generally achieves a high overall response rate, emphasizing short, 
clear text blocks and engaging respondents with evenly spaced questions throughout the survey. 
Effort was made to make the program description correspond to the actual NMPC solicitation 
materials distributed to the public, despite the fact that these provided substantially less 
information than state of the art in contingent valuation research. Phone, rather than mail, 
surveys were employed in order to control for awareness. 
Successive pretests of the survey were administered by phone to ensure that respondents 
clearly understood the instrument. The final phone survey was administered by Hagler Bailly 
Consulting, Inc., using a random sample ofhouseholds in the Buffalo, New York area. 
Households in the sample were first sent a hand-signed cover letter on Cornell University 
stationery announcing the survey. They were informed that they had been selected as one of a 
small sample of customers to participate in the study of a new type of environmental program. 
The' study's sponsors were identified as the National Science Foundation and the Environmental 
Protection Agency, together with NMPC. A two dollar bill was enclosed as a token of 
appreciation for participation. 
The telephone survey itself ran as follows. Both actual and hypothetical versions began 
by reaching the person in the household who usually paid the NMPC electric bill. Speaking to 
that person, the interviewer described the survey's purpose and sponsors. The individual was 
then asked to rate NMPC's service. Next, customer awareness of the program was obtained, and 
the goals of the program were described. Respondents were then asked about their interest in 
• 
these objectives: 
13 
How interested are you in the goal of replacing fossil energy with renewable energy 
sources? On a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is not at all interested and lOis very 
interested, how interested are you? 
and later: 
How interested are you in the goal of planting trees on public lands in upstate New York? 
As before on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is not at all interested and lOis very 
interested, how interested are you? 
Depending on the version, the funding plan was then described as follows: 
The GreenChoice™ program would be funded voluntarily. Customers who decide to join 
the program would pay an additional fixed fee .Q.f..$.Q. per month on their NMPC bill. This 
fee would not be tax deductible. Customers could sign up or cancel at any time. While 
customers sign up, NMPC would ask for bids on renewable energy projects. Enough 
customers would have to become GreenChoice™ partners to pay for the program. For 
example if 12,000 customers joined the first year, they would invest $864,000, which 
would allow Niagara Mohawk to plant 50,000 trees and fund a landfill gas project. The 
gas project could replace all fossil fuel electricity in 1,200 homes. However, if after one 
year, participation were insufficient to fund GreenChoice™ activities, Niagara Mohawk 
would cancel the program and refund all the money that was collected. 
For the open-ended format, the underlined section was removed. The exact dollar amount of the 
provision point was hedged by NMPC so that the renewable energy project could be sent for 
competitive bid while the program was underway. 
The survey then asked respondents whether the program's funding mechanism made 
them more or less interested in the program. After this, respondents in the actual version were 
faced with the participation question: 
So far I've described the GreenChoice™ program, as well as the $6 per month cost it 
would add to your household's electrical bill, if your were to join. You may need a 
moment to consider the next couple ofquestions. Given your household's income and 
expenses, I'd like you to think about whether or not you would be interested in the 
GreenChoice™ program. If you decide to sifl:n up. we will send your name to Niafl:ara 
­
Mohawk. and fl:et you enrolled in the profl:ram. All your other answers to this survey will ,. 
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remain confidential. Does your household want to si~n up for the pro~am at a cost of 
$6.00 per month? 
In the hypothetical dichotomous choice version, the underlined portions were replaced by: 
"Would your household sign up for the program if it cost you $6 per month?" 
The hypothetical open-ended decision question was also worded in typical fashion: 
So far I've described the GreenChoice™ program. You may need a moment to consider 
the next couple of questions. Given your household's income and expenses, I'd like you 
to think about whether or not you would be interested in the GreenChoice™ program. 
What is the highest amount, if anything, that your household would pay each month and 
still sign up for the program? 
All surveys ended with debriefmg and socio-economic questions useful for modeling demand. 
As it turned out, contributions in the actual version were never collected, because the 
GreenChoice™ program itself was canceled. NMPC developed severe fmancial difficulties, and, 
having failed to pay dividends to stockholders, was unable to advertise the GreenChoice™ 
program. Those who elected to participate as a result of our phone survey were sent a 
cancellation notice, and the funds contributed by all households who signed up were returned. It 
is, of course, possible that the customers that we signed up might have reneged by leaving the 
program during the 12 month payment period. However, there is early evidence that this is not a 
large issue. For example, 95 percent of the residents who signed up for the Traverse City Wind 
Power project are continuing to paying their committed level more than one year after the 
program started. With actual and hypothetical measures of participation identified, we turn next 
to the results of the surveys. 
-
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3.2 Results and Analysis 
A random sample of 1250 households in the Buffalo, NY area, based on zip code 
delineation, was purchased from a marketing research firm. An adjusted sample of 985 
households remained after removing bad addresses, unlisted numbers, non-NMPC customers, and 
three respondents who had previously heard of the GreenChoice™ program. Among these 985 
households, 206 were in the actual mechanism sample, 393 were in the hypothetical open-ended 
sample, and 386 were in the hypothetical dichotomous choice sample.4 Of the total adjusted 
sample, 177 refused to participate, yielding an overall response rate of 72.5 percent. None of the 
subsample response rates fell below 70 percent. 
Of the actual mechanism sample of 206, 179 were reached by phone. Of these, 37 
refused or did not complete the survey. Of the remaining 142 respondents, 29 signed up for the 
program, resulting in a participation rate of 20.4 percent. Participation would fall to 16.5 percent 
if we assume that the 37 people contacted who did not complete the survey would have declined 
the program. Note also, only three people from our entire sample recalled having heard about the 
program, reflecting NMPC's decision not to market the program. As such, these data indicate 
strong potential support for the GreenChoice™ program amongst NMPC customers, and suggest 
that the program could have been funded ifmarketing had been successful in increasing 
awareness. 
4 A modified, shortened "Cheap Talk" warning (Cummings and Osborne, 1996) was used on a sub­
sample of each of the hypothetical surveys in an effort to "push down" any hypothetical bias. No difference in 
responses was detected, consistent with those authors' findings. Thus, the versions with and without "Cheap Talk" 
warnings were pooled for the analysis in the text. When used, the following warning immediately preceded the 
• 
decision question: "I have one caution though. For programs like this it's often the case that more people say they 
would sign up than actually do sign-up. Utilities in other parts of the country have found that eight times as many 
people say yes to similar programs as actually take part in them. With this in mind..." 
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The participation rate of 16-20 percent is also substantially higher than that observed in 
the majority ofother green pricing programs reported in the literature (Baugh et a/., .1995; Brynes 
et a/., 1995; Holt, 1997; Farhar and Houston, 1996). There are, however, substantial differences 
between this and most previous programs. First, program awareness was controlled here at 
100%. In previous programs, participation rates have typically been defined over the broader 
base of total customers or customers targeted with direct mailings. Yet, as our findings suggest, 
customer inserts and direct mailings do not guarantee even minimal awareness among customers. 
Secondly, as noted, previous participation programs have mostly relied upon voluntary 
contributions, rather than the provision point mechanism used here. 
Thus, the 20.5 percent sign-up rate provides a benchmark for testing the hypothetical 
bias associated with open-ended and dichotomous choice CV questions among survey 
respondents. We do so using two methods of analysis. First we compare participation rates 
across actual and hypothetical versions using simple tests of proportions. Second, we model the 
participation decision and, controlling for socio-economic and other factors, test the hypothesis 
that response rates differ between actual and hypothetical treatments. To conduct the analysis, 
open-ended responses are converted to participation rates based on whether the values given 
exceed the $6 threshold. 
As shown in Table 1, the estimated participation rate from the open-ended responses is 
23.9 percent. The participation rate from the dichotomous choice responses is 30.5 percent. 
These results contrast with the NOAA panel recommendation that dichotomous choice values 
offer conservative, and thus preferable, estimates of value (Arrow et a/., 1993). At the same time, ­
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they are consistent with previous comparisons in CV and laboratory experiments (see Brown et 
az', 1996 and Schulze et az', 1996 for recent reviews). A test of proportions rejects the 
hypothesis that actual and hypothetical open-ended participation levels differ at any standard 
level of significance (t=0.73). In contrast, the dichotomous choice sign-up rate of 30.5 percent is 
higher than the actual value of20.5 percent at the 5 percent level of significance (t=2.12). 
Following established dichotomous choice valuation techniques, we next assume a logistic 
distribution function to model an individual's participation decision as a function of covariates 
elicited in the questionnaire. Using actual responses as a base, we include binary variables to test 
whether each of the hypothetical patterns is significantly different from the actual response 
pattern. 
Three categories ofcovariates are included when modeling participation. The first 
concerns respondents' support for the particular objectives of the program: replacing fossil fuels 
and planting trees in upstate New York. Interest in each goal was measured using a scale of one 
("not at all interested") to 10 ("very interested"). Both scale responses are expected to be 
positively correlated with participation.5 
The second category ofcovariates includes demographics, such as gender (male=I), age (in 
, years), and education (college graduate or higher =1). Also included here are recent financial 
support of environmental groups (Yes=1), and impression of the overall service received from 
5 Respondents were also asked immediately prior to the participation question how they viewed the 
program in comparison with other causes they might support, like the United Way, public television, or 
environmental groups, again using a scale of one (much less favorably) to 10 (much more favorably). This question 
-
was included to allow participants to consolidate their preferences and perceptions, as well as to remind them of 
possible substitutes for this program. Responses are not included in the econometric analysis because individual 
responses were endogenous functions ofexpressed interest in program characteristics and mechanism design. 
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NMPC on a 1 ("very poor") to 10 ("very good") scale. These types of variables are widely used 
as explanatory covariates in the literature modeling environmental valuation.6 From this literature 
we expected age to be negatively correlated with participation, and education, impression of 
NMPC service, and participation in environmental groups to be positively correlated with 
participation. 
The fmal category of covariates concerns respondents' views of the program's funding 
mechanism. These variables are unconventional, in the sense that they do not proxy for the value 
of the program itself. When told of the provision point and money back guarantee, respondents 
were asked the following two questions: 
Does the fact that a minimum level ofcustomer participation is required for 
GreenChoice™ to operate make the program ofless interest to you, more interest, or 
does it not affect your interest? 
Does the fact that Niagara Mohawk would refund all the money it collects--if support is 
insufficient--make GreenChoice™ ofless interest to you, more interest, or does it not 
affect your interest in the program? 
The provision point itself did not arouse greater interest in the program. Over 55 percent 
responded that its inclusion did not affect their interest. Only 17 percent indicated that it 
increased their interest. In contrast, the money back guarantee increased interest in the program 
for 47 percent of respondents. Only 9 percent said that it reduced their interest. Both questions 
were recoded as binary variables for estimation, assigned' 1' for "more interest," and '0' 
6 The estimation procedure was motivated by a linear random utility difference model. Thus income is 
-
not included in the estimation (Hanemann, 1984). Similarly, in contrast to standard dichotomous choice CV 
models, price is not included as an explanatory variable of participation, because it is constant at $6 across all 
participants. 
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otherwise. We expected their coefficients to be positive. 
Joint and individually estimated logit models of program participation are reported in 
Table 2, together with sample means, standard deviations, and expected signs. The first column 
of coefficient estimates provides a joint model of participation with binary shifts for 
hypothetical open-ended and dichotomous choice responses. Actual contribution decisions serve 
as the baseline. The last three columns of the table provide separate estimation results for the 
actual, hypothetical open-ended, and hypothetical dichotomous choice participation decisions. 
In general, the sign of the coefficients reflects prior expectations, and the overall models 
are highly significant. Favorable impressions ofprogram characteristics tend to be positively 
correlated with program enrollment, although the coefficient on trees is not significant in any of 
the individual equations. Consistent with our expectations from the experimental provision point 
literature, the provision point and the money back guarantee are positively correlated with and 
each is a significant explanatory variable of participation, in both the joint and most individual 
models. The demographic characteristics are also largely consistent with prior environmental 
valuation research. Participation is negatively correlated with age and positively correlated with 
being male or a member of an environmental organization. Neither education nor rating of service 
is significant in any of the regressions. Overall, the significance ofeach of the equations and 
individual explanatory variables demonstrates that responses to the questions vary in a 
systematic fashion. 
After accounting for these covariates, the binary variables for hypothetical responses in 
•the joint model tell a tale similar to the simple tests of proportions. The coefficient for 
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hypothetical open-ended responses is small and not significantly different from zero. In 
contrast, the dichotomous choice responses are significantly different from actual decisions at the 
10 percent level.7 These results suggest that open-ended CV provides a more accurate prediction 
of participation than does dichotomous choice. This result is in keeping with Brown et al. 
(1996), who find, in comparing CV to VCM results, that dichotomous choice values exceeded 
open-ended values, which in turn exceeded actual contributions. Our results also suggest that 
free-riding may explain the difference between open-ended willingness to pay and actual 
contributions found in the Brown et al. study. 
In assessing contingent valuation, Mitchell and Carson (1989) adapt the sociological 
concepts of criterion validity and construct validity. Criterion validity refers to the goodness of 
fit of CV estimates to benchmark values, such as market prices. Construct validity refers to 
"	 whether CV estimates are related to explanatory variables as expected according to economic 
theory. Applying these measures here, open-ended responses appear to have a higher criterion 
validity than do dichotomous choice responses, where the reference criterion is the PP/MBG/EB 
mechanism used by NMPC. At the same time, the logistic analysis suggests that dichotomous 
choice responses perform better in terms of construct validity. That is, the dichotomous choice 
7	 Letting LL denote the log likelihood, a likelihood ratio test LR= -2(LLResticted - LLUnrestrictecV was 
used to test the null hypothesis of equality of all coefficients across equations (with the exception of a binary shift 
variable for each equation). The test across all three survey versions is rejected at the 5 percent level of significance 
(LR=40.786 > 40.113 = X2(0.05,27». The null hypothesis of equality between actual and open-ended responses 
(LR=12.133 < 14.684 = X2 (0.05,9» and actual and dichotomous choice responses (LR=12.133 < 14.684 = X2 
(0.05,9» cannot, however, be rejected. As such, rejection of a joint model pooling all response functions appears 
to be driven by the inequality of open-ended and dichotomous choice response functions (LR=35.24I > 14,684 = 
X2 (0.05, 9». Moving to paired actual-hypothetical pooled regressions, the significance of the binary shifters reflects 
the significance levels reported in Table 2. The coefficient on the hypothetical open ended responses was not ­
significant at any level (t=0.73) while that on the hypothetical dichotomous choice responses was significant at the 
10 percent level (t=1.82). 
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regression exhibits a substantially better fit (as measured by the likelihood ratio) than the open-
ended response function. This suggests that open-ended responses do not vary as systematically 
with socio-economic characteristics as do dichotomous choice responses. However, given the 
relatively close correspondence of hypothetical open-ended responses with actual participation 
levels, these results challenge the usefulness of construct validity as a dominant criterion for 
evaluating CV elicitation techniques. 
4. CALIBRATION OF HYPOTHETICAL RESPONSES 
As indicated in the previous section, some upward hypothetical bias remains even when a 
demand revealing mechanism is used to provide a reference for actual willingness to pay. Two 
different methods have been recently suggested in the CV literature to calibrate or adjust 
~ hypothetical values obtained from open-ended or dichotomous choice responses to more closely 
reflect actual values. Such calibration is widely used in market research to adjust survey 
responses to predict actual demand. Here, we examine the accuracy of these two methods. 
With respect to open-ended responses, Schulze et al. (1997) argue that a "disembedding" 
question following the open-ended question may reduce hypothetical bias by reminding 
respondents to only state values for the specific good in question rather than including other 
"embedded" values such as moral satisfaction. In the NMPC survey, this calibration was 
accomplished as follows. First, individuals were asked to answer an open-ended willingness to 
pay question as previously described. The following issue is then raised: 
Some people say that it's hard to think about the amount you would pay for a specific ­
program like GreenChoice™, rather than for environmental programs or other good causes 
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in general... 
and individuals are asked if their bid on the open-ended question was just for the GreenChoice™ 
program or if the stated WTP included values for a wider range of environmental or public causes. 
If the respondent indicates that, "Yes, my stated value included other causes," then they are 
asked to estimate the proportion of their stated value that was for the GreenChoice™ program. 
This "disembedded" portion is then multiplied by the original open-ended value to isolate the 
value for the program. 
Several studies have used this approach, with self-reported embedding ranging from 20 
percent (clean up local groundwater, McClelland et al., 1992) to 50 percent (medium size oil 
spills, Rowe et aI., 1991). In addition to the notion that individuals are embedding their specific 
values within a broader stated value, two other interpretations of these self-reported adjustments 
have been offered. First, experimental economists have found that in repeated rounds, values 
tend to fall after the first bid. In other words values tend to be overstated on the first round and 
tend to approach induced or actual values in subsequent rounds (Davis and Holt, 1993). The 
disembedding question thus allows individuals to act as if they are in a more experienced, second 
round situation. Second, the disembedding question might act as a reminder that individuals may, 
want to spend their money in other ways, thus providing an additional opportunity to consider 
budget constraints and substitutes. The need for emphasizing these constraints in the contingent 
valuation question was higWighted in Arrow et al. (1993). 
Champ et al. (1995, 1997) have suggested an alternative debriefmg method appropriate to 
• 
dichotomous choice contingent valuation. Building on evidence that individual respondents have 
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some uncertainty in their WTP values (Gregory et a!., 1995; Ready et a!', 1995; Poe and Welsh, 
1996), this approach asks those who responded "Yes" to the dichotomous choice question the 
following debriefing question: 
So you think that you ~ sign up. I'd like to know how sure you are of that. On a 
scale from 1 to 10, where "I" is "very uncertain" and "10" is "very certain," how sure are 
you that you would sign up and pay the extra $6 a month? 
Using similar wording, a CV field validity study ofWTP for road removal on the north rim of the 
Grand Canyon (Champ et a!., 1995) found that estimating a model, in which only the ''yes'' 
respondents who had a certainty level of' 10' were coded as yes responses, was not significantly 
different from actual contributions. It should be noted again that the Champ et a!. reference for 
actual contributions was obtained using a voluntary contribution mechanism, which may lead to 
excessive adjustment. 
The results of these calibration approaches are reported in Table 3. On average, the open-
ended respondents reported that 23 percent of their values were embedded (Le. that their value 
for the program was 77 percent of their original open-ended response). This lowered the entire 
open-ended WTP distribution, and reduced the estimated percentage who would have said yes to 
$6 to 16.4 percent. Although this is lower than the actual contribution level of 20.5 percent, it 
(as well as the original unembedded open-ended proportion) is not significantly different from 
this reference value (t=0.89). However, these results are suggestive in the sense that they 
demonstrate that overcompensation using this approach is possible. Over-correction is predicted 
in the psychological literature on self-correction when the subjects are given additional 
• 
information on sources of error, as was done with this case in the embedding question (Wegener 
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and Petty, 1997; Wilson and Brekke, 1994). 
Dichotomous choice respondents reported a wide range ofcertainty levels. Only a small 
percent reported that they had a certainty level of '10', with the mode being at '1'. Sign-up 
proportions accounting for different certainty level thresholds are provided in Table 3. 
Proportions associated with treating yes responses with subsequent certainty levels of "greater 
than or equal to '6'" to "greater than or equal to '8'" as "true" yes responses, are not 
significantly different from the actual sign-up rate. However, a certainty level of greater than or 
equal to '7' most closely corresponds to the actual sign up rate. These calibration results differ 
somewhat from the Champ et al. (1995, 1997) fmdings. In addition to the aforementioned 
mechanism effects, these differences between the two studies may be attributed to the good 
itself, or to phone versus mail formats. 
A third calibration approach generally attributed to the NOAA proposed regulations 
(1994) suggests that WTP values be divided by two in order to correct for hypothetical bias. 
Using this 50 percent calibration rule on the open-ended values resulted in an estimated 
participation rate of 7 percent at $6, which substantially overcorrects hypothetical responses 
with respect to the actual. If instead, the percent of participants at $6 of the dichotomous choice 
hypothetical values was used, then the estimated percent approximates 15 percent, which is 
below, but not significantly different than the actual participation rate (t=I.25). Some caution 
should be taken, however, in assuming a direct correspondence between correcting DC percent 
and a shift in WTP. In other words, halving the percent at $6 may not directly correspond to 
• 
halving the estimated WTP, due to non-linearities in underlying WTP distributions. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
Three principal conclusions emerge from the research presented here. 
First, contingent valuation can provide reasonable estimates of actual public good program 
participation--when free riding is addressed in the mechanism utilized to actually provide the 
good. Our laboratory and field experiments suggest that prior field experiments may have shown 
. biased results because of their reliance on the voluntary contributions mechanism. 
Second, the elicitation method used in contingent valuation matters for the reliability of 
the method in predicting actual participation. In particular, dichotomous choice substantially 
overestimates actual participation, by about fifty percent, while open-ended willingness to pay 
overestimates by seventeen percent. Calibration methods have been proposed for both methods 
that can provide conservative estimates of participation and, potentially, of value. 
Third, a comparison of the results of this field study with economics laboratory 
experiments that have examined hypothetical bias shows substantial parallelism. A recent survey 
of this literature (Schulze et aI., 1996) argues that, for open ended willingness to pay questions, 
"...one has to conclude that some upward bias is likely to be present." In contrast, the 
experimental evidence concerning dichotomous choice shows that values from dichotomous 
choice uniformly exceed actual values (Balistreri et al., 1996; Cummings et al., 1995) and also 
exceed those obtained using open-ended willingness to pay (Schulze et al., 1996). This apparent 
parallelism could be a powerful tool in advancing contingent valuation techniques using 
•laboratory experimental methods. 
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Response Type Percent Participation 
(observations) 
Actual Dichotomous Choice 20.4 
(n = 142) 
Hypothetical Open Ended (OE Hypo) 23.9 
(n = 284) 
Hypothetical Dichotomous Choice (DC Hypo) 30.5 
(n = 259) 
Table 1: Proportion of Actual and Hypothetical Sign-Ups by Response Type 
-

Table 2: Estimated Logit Models by Response Category 
Variable 
(Description) 
Exp. 
Sign 
Mean 
(s.d.) Joint 
Estimated Coefficients (s.e.) 
Actual OEHypo DC Hypo 
Constant -4.024 
(0.856)*** 
-4.386 
(2.184)** 
-2.471 
(1.167)** 
-5.143 
(1.602)*** 
D-DC Hypo 
(DC Hypo=l) 
0.38 
(0.49) 
0.574 
(0.299)* 
D-OE Hypo 
(OE Hypo=l) 
0.41 
(0.49) 
0.142 
(0.298) 
Renewables 
(1 to 10 scale) 
+ 6.38 
(2.71) 
0.150 
(0.047)*** 
0.233 
(0.118)** 
0.119 
(0.099) 
0.297 
(0.085)*** 
Trees 
(1 to 10 scale) 
+ 8.44 
(2.23) 
0.116 
(0.065)* 
0.216 
(0.186) 
-0.012 
(0.073) 
0.154 
(0.116) 
D-Prov. Pt. 
(Interest=1) 
+ 0.17 
(0.38) 
1.353 
(0.259)*** 
1.416 
(0.588)** 
0.925 
(0.411)** 
1.868 
(0.479)*** 
D-MBGuar 
(Interest=1) 
+ 0.48 
(0.50) 
0.626 
(0.220)*** 
-0.098 
(0.550) 
0.734 
(0.329)** 
0.758 
(0.425)* 
Age 
(Years) 
51.9 
(16.3) 
-0.023 
(0.007)*** 
-0.040 
(0.019)** 
-0.039 
(0.011)*** 
-0.003 
(0.013) 
D-Gender 
(Male=l) 
? 0.46 
(0.50) 
0.463 
(0.213)** 
0.954 
(0.517)* 
0.432 
(0.323) 
0.224 
(0.388) 
D-Cgrad 
(Cgrad=l) 
? 0.36 
(0.48) 
0.181 
(0.223) 
0.002 
(0.997) 
0.300 
(0.321) 
0.275 
(0.450) 
D-Enviro 
(Contribute =1) 
+ 0.24 
(0.43) 
1.108 
(0.233)*** 
0.666 
(0.624) 
0.461 
(0.346) 
2.474 
(0.451)*** 
Rate Service 
(1 to 10 scale) 
+ 8.45 
(1.65) 
0.074 
(0.069) 
0.082 
(0.178) 
0.154 
(0.102) 
-0.087 
(0.134) 
ChiSq 148.93 31.10 35.99 117.11 
n 620 128 255 237 
*,**, and *** indicate 10,5 and 1 percent significance, respectively. • 
Table 3: Actual Sign-ups and Calibrated Hypothetical Sign Ups 
Percent Participation 
(observations) 
Response Type 
20.4 
(n=142) 
Actual Dichotomous Choice 
Hypothetical Open Ended, 16.4 
Revised for Embedding (n=280) 
Hypothetical Dichotomous Choice (DC Hypo), 
Revised for Certainty 
All or Unrestricted 30.5** 
(n=259) 
29.0* 
(n=259) 
Certainty 2: 5 
Certainty 2: 6 24.7 
(n=259) 
20.9 
(n=259) 
Certainty 2: 7 
Certainty 2: 8 13.9 
(n=259) 
8.5*** 
(n=259) 
Certainty 2: 9 
Certainty = 10 6.6*** 
(n=259) 
-
*,**, and *** indicate that the proportions are significantly different from the "actual" value at the 
10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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